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AUTHENTICATING LOSS 
AND CONTESTING RECOVERY 
FEMA and the Politics of Colonial 
Disaster Management 
Sarah Molinari 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA ) has consumed 
headline s in Puerto Rico since Hurricane Marfa made landfall. From 
che pre st0 rm underscaffing and lack of Spanish-speaking workers co 
chc undelivered pallets of water and big contracts for inexperienced 
bidders , news of che US disaster agency's problem s grabbed local and 
international media attention. Bue the FE.MA central operations 
hub had an air of efficiency and organization. The GRF Media build -
ing in Guaynabo chat hou ses FEMA' s central offices bustled like a 
newsroom on che day I visited co condu ce an interview - rows of 
open desks, phone s ringing, message board s, maps, and hundred s of 
staffers. Behind the appearance of smooch operations, however, were 
layers of failure and incomplete recovery. According to FEMA daca,1 
the agency approved 464,82 1 applications for rh~ Individu al . and 
Household Assistance Program, which covers repair coses co pnma-
ry residen ce personal property and household structural damage in 
designated "essentia l living areas.'' 2 Bue chis number fails co account 
for chose who were approved but underfunded and for the more than 
three hundred thousand applicants who were denied. While man y 
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filed appeals, FEMA denied or did not respond co 79 percent of rhc 
appeal claims.' I argue chat insncucional failure gave way ro contest-
ed recovery frameworks chat challenge rhe assumptions of colonial 
disaster management and its disciplining tools. 
UNEQUAL DISASTER AND ~DTRAS MARfAS" IN LAS CAROLINAS, C GUAS 
In the semiruraJ neighborhood of Las Carolinas, Caguas, where I 
am conducting ethnographic research and collaborating with the 
neighborhood Centro de Apoyo Mutuo (CAM; Mutual Support 
Center), layered abandonment over time and demographic specific-
ities exacerbared the impact of Hurricane Marfa. sixty co sevent) 
percent of rhe community's twenty -five hundred residents are over 
fifty-five years old, and one in three households lives below the pover-
ty line.• According to the Residents' Association , Las Carolinas has 
lost 20 percent of its population since 2013, leaving behind elderly 
residents with tenuous family support. In the words of a CAM leader 
reflecting on the storm's one-year anniversary , "Before Jiving ch rough 
Maria , we experienced otras Al arias. Because for the people with less 
resources, we're che ones who are always at chc boccom." 
Families left Las Carolinas in large number , especially in 2017 
when the Puerto Rico Department of Education shut down the 
Maria Montanez Gomez elementary school as pare of chat year's wave 
of 167 school closures. Parents, residents, and teachers had struggled 
since 2012 co keep Las Carolinas's only elementary school open 
through protests, standardized test boycorcs, strikes, and countless 
meetings with education and municipal officials. Bue the Depart-
ment of Education pointed to below-a,·erage scores on standardized 
tests and declining enrollment, finally shumng the school down in 
spring 2017. Recalling che five-year struggle, one mother cold me: 
My dad, aunts and uncles, my kids, and I all studied here . I re-
member rhe lase sixth-grade graduation here was when my young-
est son graduated . .. • I remember we hdd a strike co protest the 
school closing, and a friend of mine asked me, "\X'har are }OU do-
ing here?• Ami I ,aid, "W"hy arc you asking me rhh?w "Because 
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your son already graduated," she s.tid. And I said. "What doc, char 
have co do with anything? M) son graduated, bur he came from 
here, and I still have hi~ cousins here. and I'm here for them , and 
for your daughter coo, who's still here. 
After Maria, Las Carolinas residents went without water service 
for three months , w1chour electricity for seven months, and wirhour 
scorn, municipal debns pickup for c:ighcy days. During the pose-
Marfa wait for debris collection, some residents made a monthly 
ritual out of acknowledging the debris's "birthday" and decorat -
ing the piles lining the streets with Christmas ornaments. Truch 
from chc privately contracted company EC Waste finally appeared 
in early December 2017 after che Residents' Associacio~ pr_e~id~nt, 
Miguel Rosario Lozada, wrote an op-ed in El Nruvo Dra crmqumg 
the mayor and what he called "the absent municipal scace."5 Among 
other things, the municipality kept delaying debris picku~, barely 
circulated information, and onginally scheduled Las Carolinas last 
d r · 6 among all the municipality 's neighborhoo s ror power ~escor~uon. 
Even after debris removal, residents organized cleaning bngades 
co do basic Yegccarion maintenance like rrec mmming and m~w-
mg around che public screecs. The hollowing out of these municipal 
services certainly contributed co the posrhurricanc blackout and 
infrastructure collapse chat was part of a longer process of public 
divestment. For example, che municipal icy of Caguas cue back on 
maintenance with a 14 percent coral budget cue from 2016 co 2018, 
exacerbated by a $350 million cue from co the central go\'ernmenc's 
contributions co all municipalities in fiscal year 201- -18-budgccs, 
of course, approved and imposed by che colonial Fiscal Conrrol 
Board, locally referred co as la Junta. ~ 
Beyond the uneven effects of austerity and Maria , disaster ass~s-
cance and recovery measures chcmselYeS may exacerbate vulnerabd-
it) and inequality over cime.8 These contradictions have also shaped 
alternative }\·ays of imagining recovery ch rough tZpo_yo mutuo (mutual 
support ) rather rhan dominant individualizing and markec-dri~en 
frameworks meant co restort pnvacc property, wealth, and the exist-
ing social order. 
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"TOTAL LOSS" AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ADIGNIFIED HOME 
Jennifer, a residenr of Las Carolinas, still lives with a blue tarp cover-
ing her roof fifi:een months alter Hurricane Mana. 9 She lives with five 
family members in the basement of her house because che top floor 
is uninhabitable. She applied for FEMA's Individual and Household 
Assistance Program, and FEMA inspectors arrived five weeks afier 
Mana ro declare Jennifor's house a "total los~." Jennifer ha\ lived in 
her home for forty-four years, bur like many ochers in the communi-
ty \\ ho live on parcel,is char have been divided over rime and passed 
on through inhemance, she does nor have formal property tirle.1° In 
face, a confidenrial FEMA memo from 201 l lim Las Carolinas as 
one of I 16 areas in Puerto Rico chat FEMA identifies as a "squatte r 
communicr."
11 
The memo provides impccnon gu1delmes and scares 
chat ~quarters, and prcsumabl> the entire communities listed, arc 
itul({!,ible for home repair assistance because "rhc> are nor the own-
er of rhc damaged dwelling." In November 2018 rhe FL\[A Puerto 
Rico News Desk confirmed with me via email correspondence char 
the 2011 squatter communities list had not been updated, although 
it remains unclear whether this list was used during Hurricane Maria 
and how rhe memo might have shaped prejudiced a\sumpriom about 
"squarten and identified communities. Legal activist groups like 
Ayuda Lcg,ll Huracan Mana pressured 1--EMA co revise its policy on 
verifying and assisrmg individual owners ren months after l\faria. 12 
Under the revised policy, applicants could submit a" declarative state-
ment" to "prove" ownership wich their FEMA appl-als if che) did noc 
have a formal cirlc, but this was coo little too lace. FEMA faded co 
systematically circulate information about chis new option to verify 
o,,·ner,hip, leaving many who would have qualified out of the loop. 
Because of her tenuous ownership status in the eyes of the state, 
Jennifer applied for FEMA individual assistance. supported b) an affi-
davit from a pro bono lawyer staring chat she was the rightful owner 
and occupant of rhe homt: and that she was securing her form,tl title. To 
Jennitcr's surprise, Puerto Rico's Departamenco de Vivienda (Hous-
ing Department) finall)• began procemng her application for a forma l 
title alter .Man,\, even though she: had been applying for decades. She 
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expressed co me a ,cme of relief because ,he ,tlmo:st had her tide, as if 
rhb dowmcnc might reduce her vulnerability co iurure storms. 
FE~1A imralled a blue carp un Jennifer's home and authorized 
$11,000 co repair structural damage, including a new cemenr roof, 
doon, and windows. Jennifer has nor, however, been able to find a 
contractor co do rhe job within chis budget because \he estimates 
chat $11,000 will cover only materials, wood, and some of the labor. 1' 
She appealed che rEMA decision co err co gee a larger amount bur 
\\ as denied and could not understand how "coral loss" amounted co 
$11,000: ~lhey came and cook photos. !hey s,1w," she said. 
To fill in the :Misrancc: gap, che Dc:parcamenro de Vn 1enda rec-
ommended chat Jennifer apply for Tu Hogar Renace (Your Home 
Is Revived), a FEMA-fonded program local!) admmiscered through 
rhe Deparcmenco de \'1v1enda chat provides up to $20,000 for minor 
emergency repairs co make house "safe and functional." Tu Hogar 
Rcnace is organized around seven construction conglomerates (five 
US companies, cwo Puerto Rican companies) char have divided up 
che archipelago into concraccor zones. Note.: char the Tcxas-ba~ed 
SLS Company (designated for zone 2) was award~d a $1_45 m11l'.on 
contract in 2018 for Texas border wall conscrucnon, h1ghl1glmng 
the entanglements between the US disaster and security indusmes. 
These seven major companies then contract smaller conscrucnon 
companies in Puerto Rico co proV1de labor and materials, bur the 
major profit, arc funnded co che top. \[y interviews with Tu Hogar 
Ren.Ke and fEMA impeccors revealed the exploitative nature of 
mspcccion work. Impeccors working for FE~[A's subconcracrors 
described working seven days a week "de sol a sol" {from sunup to 
sundown ) and driving in difficult conditions in their personal v~hi-
cb, ofi:en without GPS or phone signal, co inspect homes both bctore 
and afi:cr disascc.:r aid was dmributcd. Inspectors, many of them low-
paid Puerto Rllan workers\\ 1th lircle expenencc _or for'.n_al_ training 
in chis field were generall~ paid per inspection, 1ncent1v1zmg them 
co work like
1
"machincs," as one impccror described. TI1ey act as the 
"eyes of FE~[A " and collect evidence on c.lecrronic tabkts using for-
mulas, written comments, mcasureml.!nts, inventories, and photos to 
,luthcncicate rhe owner's account ofloss and damage: they then ~end 
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che report co FEMA for quality-control reviews for final approval. 
Even though final aid determinations arc out of their hands, inspec-
tors described scracegies like caking extra phocos or photographing 
structural damage at dramatic angles to help residencs receive the 
most aid possible. One of the main casks for workers doing Tu Hogar 
Renace final inspections was co ensure rhac the house was "habitable'' 
and thac all construction materials and appliances were properly 
installed and made in che United Scates-if something was identified 
as an incernacionally made product, ic failed inspection and needed 
co be reinstalled. 
a, .. .....,,. 
Tu Hogar Renace contractors. Screenshot of website, November 2018. 
Tu Hogar Renace approved Jennifer for the maximum $20,000 
for interior repairs like replacing che stove, sinks, refrigerator, cab-
inets, and beds and for installing electric generacors.1'' Bur Jennifer 
kept delaying the work because it made no sense co install interior 
equipment without a proper roof. "I was waiting and waiting, time 
was passing, and che roof was becoming more damaged. And every 
time [Tu Hogar Renace] wanced to come and install che equipment, I 
had to scop them because without a roof everything inside che house 
would be damaged," she said. Tu Hogar Renace cold Jennifer to call 
once she had che roof done. Then around September 2018, she called 
because she had gotten some temporary zinc panels on pare of rhe 
roof. so she figured she could scare installing che interior equipment 
little by lirde. Bur Tu Hogar Renace had closed her case wichour any 
Authenticating Loss and Contesting Recovery I 291 
nori ficarion. "Time was up," they cold her, and the promised $20,000 
vanished. Ironically, Tu Hogar Renace's webpage logo reads, "The 
first step to your recuperation" (hccps://tuhogarrenace.com/). 
I asked Jennifer if she was going to appeal the Tu Hogar Renace 
decision, which she had a right co do, bur she said no because "chey don't 
answer che phones. There are always problems with the contact. And 
so here I am." After the slow violence of rhe bureaucratic marathon 
that seemed to work against her every step of che way, she felt resigned 
and overcome with a kind of disaster assistance fatigue. The slow vio-
lence of this wait for documents, inspections, follow-up calls, and con-
tractors was not eventful or extraordinary bur rather banal, everyday, 
and formative of Jennifer's experience of pose-disaster trauma and the 
anxiery of living without a roof.15 Jennifer's experience unsettles the 
normative cemporality of disaster that moves linearly from response 
to recovery and rebuild ing-without a proper roof, "recovery" seemed 
stuck in time for her. 
DISCIPLINING DISASTER SUBJECTS 
Jennifer's case highlights the disciplining role that properry plays in 
dominant inStitutional disaster relief frameworks, or the tensions be-
tween FEMA's reliance on formal property title versus people's lived 
experience of diverse property relations in Puerto Rico. Discourses 
stigmatizing residents without formal property titles came up repeat-
edly in my interviews with officials from agencies like FEMA and 
COR3. 16 The project to "formalize property" is in face central co 
official visions of "resiliency," mitigation, and disaster preparedness 
in pare because it ensures che smooth operation of che homeowners' 
insurance market and future property speculation. The July 2018 
draft central government Disaster Recovery Plan proposes $800 mil-
lion to promote property ride registration and establish penalties for 
those who do not register, bur with little detail about how chis will 
be executed. Furthermore, Puerto Rico's Deparcamento de Vivien-
da's amended Action Plan for federal CDBG-DR funds includes a 
proposal for a $400 million "Tide Clearance Program" to formalize 
tide for properties not located in floodplains or landslide risk areas.1~ 
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In lace May 2018, I visired the Caguas Disaster Recuperation 
Center to inquire about municipality-specific FEMA data because 
I could not find this information online. There were only about 
four residents in a large gymnasium making their rounds through 
the information tables. In fact, rhere were more armed guards in the 
gymnasium than Caguas residents, although it was unclear whac che 
security threat was. The director cold me he could not give out any 
information, but he gave me a contact at the FEMA Media Rclac1ons 
Department. From there, f communicated via email and was veered 
for over two months by both Media Relations and the News Desk 
to scheduJc an interview with a high -ranking FEMA Coordination 
Officer in August 2018. This process of accessing information and 
navigating contacts and offices was, of course, enabled by my own 
posirionaliry as a whice, English-dominant visiting researcher. 
I was given a fifi:een-minuce time sloe wich chis official and 
ch ree of hb sea ff members, who sac in the room keeping time and 
audio-recording the interview, which I was also audio -recording. 
I asked abouc FEM A's perspective on the widespread trouble peo-
ple were having with their applications and appeals . Referring co 
FEMA 's five- to ten-year vision, the official said: 
\Xfe're trying to change the culture of waiting for rhe lase min-
ute .... The people in Puerto Rico need co scare chinking, •1 need 
to rake care of mysc:l( I have co be responsible for my own future. 
I have co cake action. I can't wait for stuff co be given co me." And 
l'm celling you because I'm Puerco Rican-chis is cultural. The\·'re 
waiting for scuff co happen. \Xie need co change chat co be pr~ac-
tive for our own future. lf you're going co fix your house, don't do 
it halfway. Use the besc materials. 
I rhought ofJenniter, who had been "taking action" all along , and 
all those for whom "recovery" is an ambiguous promise. The FEMA 
2018-22 Strategic Plan echoes chis culcuralist argument-promot-
ing a neoliberal "culture of preparedness," as the Coordination Offi-
cer described. The plan makes no mention of climate change, and 
its strateg ic goals include encouraging local jurisdictions co invest 
in pred1saster mitigation through new financial instruments called 
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resilience bonds; 1c aim calls for expanding homeowners ' Rood insur-
ance, incencivizing so-called positive behavior change through train-
ing and exercises, and increasing personal financial preparedness, 
which is hardly an easy cask for vulnerable, racializcd populations 
mosc at risk in these disasters. 18 For institutional agents of relief and 
recovery, che ideal "disaster subject" could be: thought of as a private 
propcrry-ownmg individual who has, a formal property title, home 
msurance, Rood insurance, savings in the bank, and a ten-day supply 
of food and water for each person in chc household. 19 
FEMA 
Get financially prepared for emergencies. 
Consider saving money in an emergency 
savings account and be sure to keep a small 
amount of cash at home in a safe place since 
ATM's and credit cards may not work during 
a disaster. 0 8 
FEMA tweet on emergency financial preparedness , April 9, 2018. 
Personal indebting also figures a) a disciplining cool of disas-
ter recovery. In August 2018 rcpre,encarives from FE.MA and the 
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Nanonal Flood Insurance Program hosred a workshop in Las Car-
olinas to promote low-interest loans from rhe federal Small Business 
Administration; these loans do nor ha\'e rhe same use restrictions as 
FEMA assistance and can be used for individual households or sma ll 
businesses to fill in rclieffunding gaps. Alier a long PowerPoint pre-
sencanon, the FEMA rcpresenranve assured a group of mostly elderly 
,urendces that these loans are secure and nondiscriminatory, un like 
private bank loans: "\Vhcn we chink about loans, we chink about 
Banco Popular, bur this is a loan co help afi:er a disaster," the represen-
tative emphasized. This was met by one frusrrarcd resident insisting 
char rhc representative review ocher disaster relief options because 
debt 1s a hard thing to sell among low-income, elderly people. 
REIMAGINING RECOVERY THROUGH APOVO MUTUO 
Bur there are local alternar1ve projects to reimagine disaster recovery 
£'ollect111ely rarher than through racisr cultural deficiency frameworks 
and modes of indcbring. For example, a number of autonomously 
organized Centros de Apoyo Mutuo arose in rhe aftermath of Hur-
ricane Maria, including one in Las Carolinas. Herc, Jennifer and 
other woman residents occupy tht: closed i\lana Montanez Gomez 
clemenrarr school, rransforming chis abandoned space into a one of 
healing, care work, and learning char has shifted in response co rhc 
community's needs from the emergency co longer-term recover) and 
local transformation. Women ar che CAM cook and home-deliver 
about one hundred lunches three nmes a week along rwo routes in 
the community ro elder!) and bedridden residents and their care-
givers, providmg a comisrent presence and form of accompaniment. 
This amounrs to about six to eight hours of unpaid labor each day, in 
addition to the incalculable emotional labor and their lives as moth-
ers, grandmothers, partner,, and d.iughcer,. Besides rhe lunch deliv-
er}, the CAM's major projects include a weekly acupuncture clinic, 
gardens, a rhrifi: hop, and an acrinrr room for rhe elderl)·, where the) 
hose calks .rnd workshops. play dominoes , ,rnd do arc projects. CAM 
leader, are partnering w1ch the Residents' Association co develop a 
community emergency plan, which "di include convening pare of 
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chc school into an emergency ,helter .rnd administering a census 
co identify resident,' specific circumstance,, like\\ hecher they rake 
medications. li\'c alone, and ha\'e limiccd mobility. 
Centro de Apoyo Mutuo, Las Carolinas. 
Photo by author. 
Local projects ofm,togestJon cannot 
replace holding scace msricunons like 
H .. MA accountable and demanding 
access co the disascer assistance and pub-
lic services char people have every righc 
co. But rhc: policies of Apoyo Muruo in chis particular case dc:mon-
srratc another path forward-albeit one constrained and shaped by 
relation, of power-char is framed around support and affecm ·e rela-
rionalmcs. 0 This "_.,ocial ecology of support" rc1ecrs individualizing 
framc:works that render people a, comumer~ 111 a recovery marker 
who arc: disciplined ch rough relations of property and debt and chm 
may point to a more equitable path forward. 
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